Forthcoming
The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem
In: C. Besson, A. Hattiangadi, & R. Padró, (Eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity, Oxford University Press, 2024.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between physicalism and property dualism in the light of the dialectic between anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses. Upon rehearsing the moves of each side, it is hard not to notice that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks on physicalism and physicalist replies. Each position can be developed in a way to defend itself from attacks from the other position, and it seems that there are neither a priori nor a posteriori grounds to choose between the two. I suggest that the reason for the intractability of the disagreement, perhaps surprisingly, is they are both true. Physicalism and dualism are formulated in terms of different conceptual schemes, each involving basic metaphysical concepts such as possibility, necessity, law and property, but the views can be reconstrued in terms of each other. My proposal is that this means that there is no real disagreement in fact; both schemes get at the same reality, in different ways.
The Illusion of the Enduring Self
In: M. Nida-Rümelin & J. Bugnon (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects. Routledge, 2024.
This paper is primarily about metaphysics; specifically, about a Cartesian view of the self, according to which it is a simple, enduring, non-material entity.I take a critical look at Nida-Rümelin’s novel conceptual arguments for this view and argue that they don’t give us decisive reasons to uphold the Cartesian view. But in Nida-Rümelin’s view, what is at stake in these arguments is not merely theoretical: the truth – and our beliefs about it – has practical consequences as well. In her view, if the Cartesian simple view of the self were false, we would have no reason to love and care for family and friends, and our special interest in our own future would be pointless. In the last section of this paper, I will say something about the sense in which it is right and the sense in which it is wrong to think that the metaphysics of the self has broader relevance for our lives.
Published
The Abolition of Phenomena: a Voyage among the Zombies
Klesis n° 55, https://www.revue-klesis.org/, 2023.
Illusionism claims that we are not conscious, that there is nothing it is like, in the usual sense of the word, to feel sad, or to smell lavender. According to Illusionists, we are, in a technical sense, zombies. Instead of arguing for the falsity of Illusionism directly, I will explain why the main philosophical motivations for it are mistaken – and I trust the rest will be taken care of by the extreme implausibility of the view. I want to spread the good news to Illusionists that they don’t need to resort to this highly counterintuitive, strange, and as I will argue later, morally corrosive idea. One can be a physicalist and phenomenal realist since neither of the two types of arguments Illusionists rely on – the conceivability arguments, and the debunking arguments against physicalist phenomenal realism – work. In the last part of the paper, I will say something about the corrosive effect this metaphysics has on our moral and evaluative outlook.
Disillusioned
Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6), 38-53, 2020.
In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with consciousness. My claim is that, while Chalmers’s project is generously ecumenical as well as beautiful in its meticulous detail, it is mistaken in its core assumption that the meta-problem can be formulated as an “easy problem” for science to solve. Furthermore, the project tilts the field toward illusionism against Type-B materialism, as far as physicalist solutions to the hard problem and the meta-problem are concerned. I will argue that Type-B materialism emerges unscathed from this dialectic.
Either/Or: Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Value
in: Enoch Lambert, John Schwenkler (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change, Oxford University Press, 254-268, 2020.
My goal is to explain and justify Kierkegaard’s exhortation “to become subjective”. I do this first, by giving an account of subjectivity that I think captures Kierkegaard’s notion and second, by mounting an argument for the central role subjectivity plays in living well. I propose that subjective thought as well as a subjective mental process underappreciated in philosophical psychology – contemplation – are crucial in forming evaluative concepts as well as in discovering and apprehending a whole range of value. This means that subjectivity is central to our practical existence.
Hard, Harder, Hardest
in: Sensations, Thoughts, Langugage: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar, Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Routledge Festschrifts in Philosophy, Routledge, 265-289, 2020.
In this paper, I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is the epistemological problem of whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is the problem of explaining how, given physicalism, phenomenal concepts can have a determinate reference. In this paper I show that, despite arguments that the Hardest Problem is unsolvable for the physicalist, it has a similar solution – via what is called the “phenomenal concept strategy” – to the first two problems.
Illusionism’s discontent
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 40-51, 2016.
Frankish argues for illusionism about conscious experience (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), by appeal to key premises of the conceivability arguments against physicalism. He thinks these premises, combined with physicalism – which he thinks we have overwhelming reason to accept – lead to eliminativism. I think he is wrong to accept key premises of the conceivability arguments; and that a more plausible physicalist response to these arguments can be given that does not involve the denial of the existence of conscious experience. I also make a general case against the scientism that motivates Frankish’s metaphysics.
Acquaintance and the Mind-Body problem
in New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Christopher Hill and Simone Gozzano (eds.), (pp. 16-43), Cambridge University Press, 2012.
In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1), 1-23, 2012.
David Chalmers has presented a Master Argument to show that any version of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – a physicalist strategy based on the idea that the notorious epistemic and conceptual gaps between physical/functional and phenomenal descriptions of the world can be best explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than by dualist metaphysical theories – fails. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia. I argue that this challenge is based on a misunderstanding of the strategy; and that the strategy is not vulnerable to any of these criticisms.
Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content
Synthese 170 (2), 311-320, 2009. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x.
Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. I examine Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states.
Phenomenal Concepts
In: Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (pp. 292-312). Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. PCs have received much attention in recent philosophy of mind mainly because they figure in arguments for dualism and in physicalist responses to these arguments. The main topic of this paper is to explore different accounts of phenomenal concepts and their role in recent debates over the metaphysical status of phenomenal consciousness.
Ontological Novelty, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem
In Günter Abel (Ed.) Kreativität (pp. 371-399). Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2006.
This paper is an exposition and comparison between two views concerning fundamental ontology in the context of the Mind-Body Problem: physicalism and emergent property dualism. I assess the pros and cons of each position and argue that physicalism provides an overall more plausible metaphysics.
The A Priori Entailment Thesis: Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3), 645-654, 2001.
A critical look at Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis (AET) – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book Jackson argues for the AET within the two-dimensional framework. But the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem
The Philosophical Review 108 (4), 497-528, 1999. Chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual.
In his very influential book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that physicalism is false. As he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I show that this argument can be refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is unsound.
In preparation
Psychology, Neuroscience and the Consciousness Dilemma
Phenomenality and accessibility are two aspects of conscious experience. “Phenomenality” refers to the felt, experiential aspect of experience, and “accessibility” to a cognitive aspect of it: its availability in general to thought processes, reasoning, decision making, etc. In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between them. Either there is a conceptual connection linking phenomenality and accessibility (i.e., it is not possible to conceive of a phenomenal experience that is not cognitively accessible for the subject) or there is none but then the empirical evidence will – for principled reasons – be unable to decide the exact nature of the relationship between the two.
The Value of Consciousness
in: Oxford University Press, The Importance of Being Conscious, edited by Adam Pautz and Geoffrey Lee.